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Uneven progress in implementing  
cross-border bank resolution in the EU 
Karel Lannoo 
Summary 
Implementing the framework for cross-border bank resolution in the EU is a work in progress, but 
it is not necessarily proceeding in a consistent way. Three banks were recently resolved in the EU, 
in which the rules were applied in a different way in each case. These varying results suggest that 
there remain important differences in supervisory approaches in the EU that will continue to have 
a large bearing on how problem banks are dealt. This situation, in turn raises questions about 
ensuring a level playing field. 
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Introduction 
The resolution of four Eurozone based (or SSM) banks in June has brought the bank crisis 
management framework back to the foreground in the EU), and. The Banco Popular case was 
hailed as a showcase of the advances made by the SSM and SRB (Single Resolution Board) in 
implementing a common approach in the EU, but the Italian cases rapidly trimmed these 
expectations. Much remains to be done in aligning crisis management and resolution in the EU 
and EMU, 10 years after the start of the financial crisis. Now that the mood in the EU has 
improved, it reminds us that implementation remains an utmost priority and challenge, 
warranting far more attention than reflecting about new schemes and structures.  
The adoption of the BRRD (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive) and SRBR (Single Resolution 
Board Regulation) moved the EU huge steps forward in putting a place an EU-wide bank crisis 
management system. What started as a discussion around living wills became an EU-wide 
framework for prompt corrective action (PCA), recovery and resolution. It should be 
remembered that the BRRD is a directive, and not a regulation, as in many cases the BRRD refers 
to national law (company law, insolvency law), which is not particularly harmonised at EU level. 
The SRBR on the other hand is a regulation, which gave to a new institution, the SRB, the powers 
to wipe out a bank’s shareholders and management and resolve a bank with a fund. Some 
questioned whether the EU even has the right to do this (on the basis of the ‘Meroni doctrine’), 
but it is also an issue in some member states, with for example the policy debate in Germany 
surrounding the nationalisation of Hypo Real Estate bank in 2008-09. 
Given the need for speed in resolution actions, the question remains whether the EU structure 
is sufficiently robust to withstand a crisis in a large cross-border bank. Given the number of 
entities involved, formally and informally, the structure remains very complex. The question we 
address in this contribution is: Have we facilitated action in dealing with banking crises or have 
we simply increased complexity? 
Can resolvability reduce the need for supervisory scrutiny?  
Resolution is part of a broader supervisory framework. If the other parts are not well 
implemented or aligned, it becomes difficult to implement resolution in a coherent fashion in 
the EU. With the exception of competition policy, most of these elements are part of national 
law or approaches, which the EU is trying to align. It is a work in progress, which in some cases 
has been going on for a long time. We consider nine different issues. 
1) Loopholes in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRDIV) (options for national discretions, 
macro-prudential buffers) and the large variations in the risk-weighted assets to total assets 
within large European banks.  
The head of the SSM, Daniele Nouy, repeats in almost every speech that bank regulatory 
standards are insufficiently harmonised in the EU.1 Even if CRDIV was negotiated at the same 
time as the SSM, it has left a large degree of discretion to the member states in 150 options 
                                                     
1 See “ECB Guide on Options and Discretions Available in Union Law”, November 2016.  
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and national discretions and in the macro-prudential buffers. It is often forgotten that 
supervision has been brought under the roof of the ECB for the eurozone, but not necessarily 
regulation, where member states continue to have a big role as the home country of a bank. 
Moreover, the debate about the output floors for internal models in the Basel Committee 
indicates that internal models result in widely varying risk-weighted assets to total assets 
among European banks using the models (see Ayadi, De Groen et al., 2016). 
2) Difference in supervisory approaches 
The way banks and markets are supervised in the EU continues to differ, creating difficulties for 
resolving banks in a unified fashion. Differences remain in the way rules are interpreted by 
supervisors, in supervisory methods, governance standards and in, for example, accounting 
standards for non-listed banks. The start of the SSM in November 2014 was a big step forward, 
but achieving convergence is still underway. In addition, many elements on the governance and 
risk-management side rely on largely national laws and practices, even within the SSM. Where 
this matters in a resolution context is the information we dispose of about the banking sector, 
and to what degree this has been harmonised. Banco Popular, for example, met the stress test 
in 2016, which can raise some questions about the way in which information was collected and 
interpreted. The interpretation of the rules with regard to investor protection is even more 
divergent, even though it was harmonised under MiFID I, which was implemented in 2007. 
MiFID I required a suitability test for selling investment products to retail investors, which can 
certainly raise the question whether this was correctly applied for subordinated bank debt. The 
mis-selling of subordinated bank debt was an issue in numerous EU countries, including Spain, 
Italy, Portugal and Slovenia.   
3) Attitude towards non-performing loans  
The legacy of large differences in supervisory approaches is also visible in the level and huge 
variation of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the EU, which has been widely publicised in recent 
months. According to data from the European Banking Authority (EBA), some countries – such 
as Italy and Portugal, with levels of 14% and 18% of NPLs to total assets, respectively – have 
levels well above the EU average of 5%. NPLs impair the ability to support economic activity, 
resulting in higher lending rates, lower lending volumes and more risk aversion. Lower recovery 
rates increase corporate bond spreads, and thus also possibility for securitisation of such 
portfolios. 
In its guidance on NPLs (final document March 2017), the ECB outlined measures, processes 
and best practices that banks should incorporate when tackling NPLs. The ECB does not 
stipulate quantitative targets to reduce NPLs, but instead, it asks banks to devise a strategy that 
could include a range of policy options such as NPL work-out, servicing and portfolio sales. The 
guidance now forms the basis of action towards banks with elevated levels of NPLs.  
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4) Facility to create bad banks 
To clean up their balance sheets, banks can bring their non-performing loan portfolio under a 
separate legal entity, a ‘bad’ bank. This entity does not necessarily need to remain a bank, but 
hands in its banking license, and de facto becomes an asset management company (AMC). 
However, the facility to create such ‘bad banks’ or AMCs depends on many different factors, 
such as supervisory approval, the enforcement of legal claims or eventually matters of 
competition policy and state aid, if it receives state guarantees or liquidity from the authorities. 
In January 2017, Andrea Enria, Chair of EBA, proposed to create a single EU AMC that would 
obtain NPLs from banks against their real economic value, and thus help to clean up balance 
sheets. 
5) Competition policy and its application to the banking sector  
How concentrated can the banking sector become? What is the relevant market for banks in 
the EU? In some domains, the relevant market is national, whereas in other cases it is European 
or international. Retail and SME lending markets are local in the EU, and cross-border provision 
of services is extremely limited. In addition, many national banking markets, certainly in 
medium-sized and smaller member states, are very concentrated. Hence, there is a 
competition issue at the local level, as EU competition policy authorities have also highlighted. 
On the other hand, ECB officials have recently called for a further phase of bank consolidation 
in the EU. A pro-active competition policy can reduce the number of too big to fail (TBTF) banks, 
but on the other hand, global markets and firms require globally active banks. 
6) Is a bank systemic? 
There is not a single definition of a systemic bank. The BRRD defines systemic as an institution 
“with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real 
economy” (Art. 1.30). Resolution tools are applicable to a bank that is systemic, and if they 
don’t qualify for the label, the bank should be allowed to fail. The earlier a bank is seen to be 
systemic, the more forbearance that can be applied by the supervisors. In Italy, two small 
Venetian banks were recently bailed out by the state as they were seen to be systemic, but 
banks of a similar size were liquidated in Denmark. 
7) State aid and role of state-owned banks 
The EU Treaty prohibits state aid. Its objective is to ensure that government interventions do 
not distort competition or trade inside the EU. State aid is defined as an advantage in any form 
whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national authorities. Since the 
financial crisis, the European Commission has set guidelines for state support to the financial 
sector. Hence restructuring a bank’s balance sheet with public funds requires the Commission’s 
prior authoritisation, and it must take place according to market terms. Exceptions exist to this 
rule. During the financial crisis, for example, Art. 107.3b of the EU Treaty was invoked to allow 
for massive support to the financial sector. This article allows state aid in case of a serious 
disturbance to the national economy. The same article, however, was used to justify state aid 
in the case of the recent Banca Veneto and Bance Populare di Vicenza resolutions, which can 
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be questioned. The reasoning was that a non-bail-out would trigger a domino effect in Italian 
banking.2 
The important role played by state-owned banks in the financial sector also makes it difficult to 
arrive at a clear position on state aid. Today, states control about 18% of the assets of the 
financial sector in the EU, a share that has increased since the crisis.3 The cost of capital of 
state-owned banks may be lower than for privately-owned banks. 
8) Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) 
National Central Banks (NCBs) continue to enjoy some latitude in providing ELA for their 
domestic financial sector, but at their own cost. ELA aims to provide central bank money to 
solvent financial institutions that are facing temporary liquidity problems. Within the eurozone, 
the ECB’s Governing Council adopted strict ex-ante and ex-post procedures that NCBs must 
follow in extending ELA, in order to ensure transparency. The latest rules, adopted on 17 May 
2017, allow NCBs to provide ELA to banks that do not meet the minimum capital requirements, 
but are expected to meet them in the next half year.4 
9) Strengths of legal rights or insolvency framework, and possibility for recourse 
The facility to exercise legal rights on claims are a fundamental pillar for well-functioning 
financial markets. However, the diversity of the related legal frameworks remains high in the 
EU. “The quality of insolvency frameworks across the euro area is low on average and highly 
diversified across member states, and has barely improved in recent years” (Valiante, 2016). In 
principle, all creditors should be treated fairly and equitably, but much uncertainty exists 
surrounding the application of the no creditor worse-off (NCWO) principle in the EU. Currently, 
when facing a liquidation or resolution of a bank operating in different countries, creditors may 
be treated differently, and different rankings of claims are applied in the EU.  
In the context described above, a ‘harmonised’ resolution framework would offer little more 
than basic plumbing, or would provide simply a common approach to subjects that had not 
been sufficiently dealt with in a common way in the phases before resolution. 
The cross-border crisis management framework 
There are now national, European (minimum requirements for eligible liabilities, MREL) and 
international rules (total loss-absorbing capacity, TLAC) for dealing with crisis of cross-border 
banks.  
The BRRD is revolutionary in the system it institutes: it requires prompt corrective action (PCA) 
as soon as a bank falls below certain ratios, requires banks to have a recovery plan and institutes 
                                                     
2 Well summarised by Erik Jones in his contribution “What we just learned about banking union from Italy” to 
eSharp!, June 2017.  
3 See Lannoo (2014) p.19. 
4 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Agreement_on_emergency_liquidity_assistance_20170517.en.pdf 
?23bb6a68e85e0715839088d0a23011db 
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a system for dealing with problem banks in different ways: liquidate, and in case the bank is 
systemic, sale of bank, splitting of activities, creation of a bad bank and bail-in of creditors for 
undercapitalised banks. Banks need to hold at least 8% bail-inable items. The BRRD also 
requires the creation of a resolution fund, which is the single resolution fund (SRF) for the EU19.  
There are, however, some obscure provisions, or loopholes, in the BRRD: 
a. Precautionary recapitalisation: This involves the injection of state funds in institutions that 
are still solvent, in the sense that they still meet their basic regulatory capital 
requirements. They cannot be used to absorb past losses, which must be covered out of 
private resources prior to the state’s intervention. Furthermore, the European 
Commission may require prior burden-sharing by private stakeholders (that is, bail-in by 
any other name, albeit of more modest proportions) as a condition for approving the 
precautionary recapitalisation under the state-aid regime. 
b. The estimation of the capital shortfall of a bank and, in particular, of the extent to which 
it is attributable to past losses is by no means an exact science. This again requires 
harmonised procedures for NPLs! 
c. NCWO and bail-in hierarchy  
Also the NCWO and the bail-in hierarchy is a work in progress. The press release on 
Popular by the Spanish resolution authority, the FROB5, is instructive in this sense. It 
states that “no shareholder or creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been 
incurred if the entity had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. To this 
end, the SRB will appoint an independent expert to perform a valuation to determine if 
shareholders would have received better treatment if Banco Popular had entered into 
normal insolvency proceedings. If said valuation determines that shareholders have 
incurred greater losses than would have been incurred if the entity had been wound up 
under normal insolvency proceedings, they would be entitled to obtain payment of the 
difference with a charge to the Single Resolution Fund.”6 
In the latest Banking Reform package (November 2016), the Commission has come 
forward with proposals to create a clear hierarchy of bail-in-able instruments and a new 
asset class of non-preferred senior debt.  
d. Is Tier 1 or MREL the standard? For PCA, Tier 1 (CET1) is the standard, but for resolution 
and bail-in, it is MREL. Both ratios have been further detailed by NCAs over the last few 
years, and are subject to a combination of EU-wide harmonised rules, and rules set by 
national authorities (as part of the options and national discretion). In addition, globally 
active banks are subject to risk-weighted TLAC and non-risk weighted MREL.  
 
 
                                                     
5 The FROB (Fondo de reestructuración ordenada bancaria), in English known as Fund for Orderly Bank 
Restructuring, was initiated by the Spanish government in June 2009. 
6 See: http://www.frob.es/en/Lists/Contenidos/Attachments/419/ProyectodeAcuerdoreducido_EN_v1.pdf 
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e. Can the SRB relegate a case to national insolvency procedures? 
In the latest case of the Venetian banks, the SRB justified non-action by an article of the 
BRRD, and referred the liquidation of the two banks to the national authorities.7 
Is the European bank crisis management working? Does it reduce or increase 
complexity? 
The recent bank resolution cases raise a host of questions with regard to the role of the SSM 
and the SRB. The Banco Popular resolution will certainly give rise to legal challenges, as 
shareholders and subordinated debtholders lost out: Was the bank effectively insolvent? Was 
PCA applied? Why did the bank pass the 2016 stress test? The ECB and the SRB’s information 
on the bank were short, but the modalities of the resolution were well detailed by the FROB. 
However, for a first test, the cooperation between the ECB, the SRB, the Commission and the 
national government(s) seems to have worked.  
In Italy, on the other hand, loopholes were necessary. For the Venetian banks, the EU rules 
were put aside, and the subordinated debtholders were compensated, which was authorised 
by the European Commission under Art 107.3b. One may wonder, however, whether this was 
a “serious disturbance to the national economy”, or rather a clean-up with government money 
of supervisory neglect. In the case of the moribund MPS, a precautionary recapitalisation was 
finally agreed upon on 1 June 2017 with the Commission, amounting to €5.4 billion, plus the 
transfer of €26.1 billion of bad loans in a bad bank, and the bail-in of junior debt holders. 
Whether this will end years of decay of the bank remains to be seen. 
Even if the four resolution cases were considered to be smaller regional banks, all four banks 
had extensive presence in other EU countries and abroad. Banco Popular was the 6th largest 
bank in Portugal and had operations in the US, Veneto Bank had operations in Croatia, and BPVI 
in Ireland and representative offices internationally. Table 1 on the following page gives an 
overview of the four banks. 
The Commission has proposed some further amendments to the EU resolution framework in 
the banking reform package, but it can be questioned whether this will necessarily facilitate the 
application of the rules. The Commission has further specified the MREL ratios for the EU’s 
global systemically important banks and for the others, while further detailing their 
composition as being part of a pillar 1 and pillar 2 instrument, or the latter only. Hence there is 
no longer a single ratio for a cross-border bank, but a multiplicity of ratios, which raises the 
question of clarity in the supervisory process, and even more during a resolution weekend (see 
SRB, 2016, p. 15). In addition, the amendments have further confused the task of resolution 
authorities with bank supervisors. Both can require additional ‘capital’ levels (and guidance), 
both can withdraw a bank licence and both will have to resolve a bank in trouble. 
 
                                                     
7 See SRB statement, 23 June 2017 
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Table 1. Four cases of bank resolution or restructuring compared 
 Banco Popular MPS Veneto Banca and BPVI  
Balance sheet and 
CET ratio (2016) 
€154 bn (listed) 
12.1% CET 
€153 bn (listed) 
8.1% CET 
€23bn, 4.5% CET; €34bn, 
7.5% CET 
P&L 2016 (2015) €-3.5 bn (100k) € -3.2 bn (388k) €-1.5 bn (881k) 
€-1.9 bn (1.4 bn) 
Supervisor SSM SSM SSM 
Resolution and 
restructuring 
SRB bail-in of 
shareholders and 
subordinated 
debtholders, sale to 
Santander 





state of €5.4 bn (after 
€3.9 bn and €13 bn 
guarantees in 2012) 
SRB resolution is not in 
public interest, left to 
Italian NRA; sale of good 
bank with state support 
of €4.8 bn, bad bank 
with state guarantee of  
€1 bn 
  Disposal of a €26.1 bn 
NPLs 
 
Source: Annual reports of respective banks and DG Comp of the European Commission. 
Another element of the crisis management system, the deposit guarantee system (DGS), is still 
in full implementation phase. The Directive, adopted in 2014, requested a fully pre-funded DGS 
at national level, but this is still in the process of being fully developed. Italy today has only €2.4 
billion in its DGS, for example. 
The European Commission has maintained supervisory colleges over another part of the 
resolution architecture, the central counterparties (CCPs). For the few systemically important 
CCPs we have in Europe, it will not be efficient to have at the same time national supervisors, 
central banks and finance ministries around the table, especially in times of crisis. 
Conclusions 
Europe has takena big step forward in its crisis resolution architecture, but much remains to be 
done, above all in implementing the rules and making the structure work in a consistent way. 
Loopholes persist, with the most problematic being the difference in tolerance levels towards 
NPLs and the related capital shortfall, and the application of a precautionary recapitalisation by 
the state for undercapitalised banks. 
The supervisory framework has become more integrated, but the EU created an additional 
authority, the SRB, planting the seeds for future tensions with the SSM (and other entities) and 
the member states. The capacity to take decisions has possibly been improved, but the 
complexity of the process has increased at the same time, which can raise problems in crisis 
situations.  
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This structure was created because taxpayers’ money should no longer be used to bail-out a 
bank. Recent events have underlined how difficult it is to apply this principle consistently, even 
for small banks. In addition, many elements of the supervisory framework remain highly 
divergent and intrinsically linked to national rules and practices. The question thus remains 
whether the structure will work when confronted with a large cross-border bank in trouble.  
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